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Abstract
We provide evidence that economic circumstances are a key intermediating variable for under-
standing the relationship between schooling and political protest. Using the World Values Survey, we
nd that individuals with higher levels of schooling, but whose income outcomes fall short of that pre-
dicted by their biographical characteristics, in turn display a greater propensity to engage in protest
activities. We discuss a number of interpretations that are consistent with this nding, including
the idea that economic conditions can aect how individuals trade o the use of their human capital
between production and political activities. Our results could also reect a link between education,
\grievance", and political protest, although we argue that this is unlikely to be the sole explanation.
Separately, we show that the interaction between schooling and economic conditions matters too at
the country level: Rising education levels coupled with macroeconomic weakness are associated with
increased incumbent turnover, as well as subsequent pressures toward democratization.
Keywords: Education; Human capital; Political protest; Demonstrations; Economic under-performance;
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Every so often, longstanding and seemingly stable incumbents have been challenged by a groundswell of
discontent and public protest, and even been forced out as a result, as vividly illustrated by the recent
events of the Arab Spring. While it is understood that simmering public dissatisfaction can suddenly erupt
in revolution (Kuran 1989), we are naturally led to ask what systematic forces or structural conditions
might lead such dissatisfaction to arise and get translated into widespread political action.
A natural starting point for this investigation is one of the best-known empirical relationships in the
social sciences, namely the strong positive correlation between schooling and political participation. It
is well-known that more educated citizens display a greater propensity to engage in virtually all forms
of political activity, ranging from more mundane acts such as voting and discussing politics, to the more
public forms of mobilization such as attending political events and demonstrating.1 Several recent studies
have shown, however, that favorable aggregate economic circumstances in the labor market can mute
the propensity of individuals to engage in political activities (Campante and Chor 2012a, Charles and
Stephens 2013). Conversely, the high unemployment rates that persisted in many Arab countries for a
broad swath of educated workers have proved to be relevant for understanding the political upheaval of
the Arab Spring (Campante and Chor 2012b).
This paper attempts to extract broader lessons from this interaction between schooling and economic
conditions. We start o by looking at individual-level data, asking whether personal economic circum-
stances aect the propensity of educated individuals to be involved in political activities. To address
this, we use data from the World Values Survey (WVS), which includes information on dierent forms
of political participation across a broad sample of countries. We rst construct a measure of the extent
to which an individual's actual income deviates from that which is predicted by a comprehensive set
of biographical characteristics, including education. This residual thus constitutes a measure of relative
income performance, in comparison with other individuals with similar attributes.
We nd robust evidence that the interaction between this income residual and one's education level is
negatively correlated with political participation. In particular, the more positive an individual's income
residual, the less responsive to education is one's propensity to engage in political activities. Conversely,
more highly educated individuals whose actual income nevertheless under-performs that predicted by
their biographical characteristics are more likely to devote their human capital toward active political
involvement. Of note, the above pattern holds true precisely for protest modes of participation such as
1This extensive literature includes: Verba and Nie (1987), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Putnam (1995), Verba et al.
(1995), B enabou (2000), Schlozman (2002), Dee (2004), Freeman (2004), Milligan et al. (2004), Hillygus (2005), Glaeser
et al. (2007), and Sondheimer and Green (2010). For interesting evidence specic to the Middle East, see El-Said and
Rauch (2012). While many of these contributions suggest a causal eect, a recent literature has called this into question
particularly for the act of voting (e.g., Tenn 2007; Kam and Palmer 2008; Berinsky and Lenz 2011).
1demonstrations, strikes or occupying buildings, but not for more civic and less time-intensive activities
such as signing petitions or discussing politics. In short, we see that economic under-performance at the
individual level conditions the link between schooling and political protest.
We discuss at some length several interpretations of this strong empirical regularity. First, the above
patterns could be driven by the decisions that individuals make over the competing uses of their human
capital in production versus (eort-intensive) political participation: Positive productivity shocks or
shifters that raise one's ability to earn income from one's human capital would naturally discourage its
use in political activities, an idea which we develop formally in the Model Appendix. Alternatively,
it could be that the link between economic under-performance and political protest operates through
\grievance": An individual's disappointment with his personal economic situation can lead to political
disaection, and perhaps especially so for the more educated. We will present some evidence indicating
that grievance motives are relevant, but that they are also unlikely to fully account for our ndings, as
our key results related to the income residual survive when we control directly for survey measures of
individual dissatisfaction.2 A third possibility is that our results could reect a form of self-selection.
For example, there could be an omitted individual characteristic (such as ideology) which tends to raise
one's intrinsic propensity to protest, but which also could be correlated with education and labor market
outcomes. Though the nature of our data makes it dicult for us to tease out a causal eect, we can
attempt to proxy for such an omitted characteristic with variables that would presumably correlate
strongly with it. As it turns out, our results are robust to including such proxies as an individual's
political positioning and religiosity. This suggests that the relationships we have found are unlikely to
be due solely to the self-selecting behavior of ideologically-extreme individuals, although we acknowledge
that other non-causal stories cannot be ruled out.
In the second half of the paper, we explore whether the interaction between schooling and economic
circumstances also has aggregate consequences, in particular for the stability of incumbent regimes. We
assemble a panel comprising more than 120 countries and spanning 1976-2010, combining updated data
on incumbent turnover collected in Campante et al. (2009) and information on country schooling from
the Barro and Lee (2010) dataset; in particular, we focus on average years of secondary schooling as a
measure of country-level schooling outcomes. Motivated by our earlier ndings, we rst proxy for country
economic circumstances by using the median income residual (computed from the WVS) for the subset
of individuals in each country who had attained at least some secondary education. We later turn to
real GDP per capita as an alternative measure of economic conditions, as this latter variable oers more
balanced coverage that allows us to apply more powerful panel data estimation techniques (including
controlling for country xed eects). Our results here indicate that the combination of high levels of
2We use the terms \grievance", \dissatisfaction", and \disaection" interchangeably in this paper.
2country secondary schooling and relatively weak economic prospects is indeed associated with a higher
frequency of incumbent turnover.
We also nd that the same interaction between country secondary schooling and income per capita
exhibits a robust negative correlation with country democracy scores, taken from the Polity IV dataset.
This is consistent with the increased incumbent turnover being accompanied by some degree of insti-
tutional change, in the direction of greater democratization. These patterns suggest that any eect
of increased education on the prospects for democracy could be contingent in an important way on
macroeconomic circumstances.
In sum, we nd that individual economic circumstances play a key intermediating role in governing the
strength of the positive association between the individual's education and her propensity toward political
protest. These relationships appear to extend to the country level, where rising levels of education
without commensurate economic gains are associated with greater uncertainty of tenure for the political
incumbent.
This paper builds naturally on Campante and Chor (2012a). While the focus in this earlier paper is
on how the interaction between individual schooling and aggregate economic conditions aects political
participation, we show here that a similar interaction is present when looking at income shocks at the
individual level. We further explore here the connection with country-level political outcomes, a link
which had been hinted at in the specic context of the Arab Spring in Campante and Chor (2012b).
In terms of the broader literature, our ndings relate to a large body of work stressing the role of the
cost of political engagement in terms of other productive uses of resources. This has been emphasized
in the study of regime transitions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2005; Burke and Leigh 2010; Br uckner
and Ciccone 2011; Aidt and Leon 2012), civil wars (Grossman 1991; Collier and Hoeer 2004), and
political violence in general (Besley and Persson 2011), and is a standard feature of rational models of
political participation (e.g., Riker and Ordeshook 1968). We specically focus on the interplay of this
logic with individual education and one's propensity toward political protest. The various interpretations
of our evidence that we oer combine elements of the \resource" view that links socioeconomic status
(such as education) with political engagement (e.g., Verba and Nie 1987), as well as of the \disaection"
view of political protest (e.g., Gurr 1970). The interaction with relative income performance also ties
in with a longstanding sociological literature that links political protest with concepts such as \relative
deprivation" and \status inconsistency" (e.g., Lenski 1954; also, see Orum 1974 or Gurney and Tierney
1982 for critical appraisals).
Our argument is further related to a venerable line of thinking that has linked modernization, and
specically increases in education, to political turmoil. For instance, Huntington (1968) has argued that
higher education in many modernizing countries failed to provide skills that were relevant to the coun-
3tries' needs, leading instead to alienation and instability. We provide evidence that is suggestive of such
a connection, while placing an added emphasis on the tradeo between the use of human capital in pro-
duction and time-intensive political activities. We also speak to the vast literature on the \modernization
hypothesis", and in particular, the link between education and democracy. This hypothesis can be traced
back at least to the seminal contributions from Dewey (1916) and Lipset (1959), and has been the subject
of considerable empirical scrutiny, recent examples of which include Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2008, 2009),
Bobba and Coviello (2007), Glaeser et al. (2007), inter alia. While there is still an active debate here on
whether education causes democracy, our results suggest that an alternative line of inquiry would be to
examine under which conditions the eects from schooling to democracy are seen to be stronger.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical strategy that we employ to
study political protest at the individual level. Section 3 presents these results. In Section 4, we turn to
the country-level evidence on incumbent turnover and democratization. Section 5 concludes. Details of
our model of political participation and our data sources are contained in the Appendix to this paper.
(A separate online appendix contains all the Appendix Tables referred to in the text.)
2 Schooling, Political Protest, and Economic Circumstances at the
Individual Level: An Empirical Framework
2.1 Data
We start by studying the relationship between schooling and political protest at the individual level.
For this purpose, we draw on data from the World Values Survey (WVS), a well-established survey of
sociocultural and political attitudes around the world. The WVS contains ve waves, conducted in 1981-
1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2008 respectively. Our eventual regression sample will
draw mostly on Waves 3-5, as the set of variables related to political participation is considerably more
limited in the earlier waves. In all, the sample that we use contains over 190,000 individuals from 148
surveys (from 84 distinct countries or territories), as listed in the Data Appendix. This contains a broad
spectrum of both developed and developing countries from all continents.
The WVS includes questions on a range of modes of political participation. We seek to understand
patterns in these measures, with an emphasis on the distinction between protest and civic modes of
participation. With regard to the former (political protest), we make use of four WVS questions (E026-
E029) eliciting one's propensity toward: (i) \attending lawful demonstrations"; (ii) \occupying buildings
or factories"; (iii) \joining in boycotts"; and (iv) \joining unocial strikes". These are forms of political
activity which are often associated with public displays of protest, and that also tend to be demanding in
terms of the time and eort required of the participants. For our analysis, we have recoded the categorical
4responses to these questions to be increasing in the degree of involvement, specically: \Would never
do" (response=0), \Might Do" (=1), and \Have Done" (=2).
We contrast the above against a set of three additional measures that correspond to \softer" modes
of political activity that are more civic in nature. These are: (i) \signing a petition" (question E025);
(ii) \discuss politics" (A062); and (iii) \vote" (E257). The rst of these variables on signing a petition
is coded on the same 0-2 scale as the preceding protest measures. The second variable solicits how
regularly one discusses political matters with friends; we recode the response options for this question
as follows: \Never" (=0), \Occasionally" (=1), and \Frequently" (=2). Last but not least, \vote" is
a binary variable asking whether the individual voted in the country's recent parliamentary election.
As this last variable is only available in Wave 5 of the WVS, the number of observations for \vote"
is considerably smaller. We have classied these three activities as non-protest modes of participation,
primarily because they tend to be less time- and eort-intensive. For example, signing a petition or
having a discussion about politics is typically less strenuous than demonstrating in a public square. As
for voting, this has commonly been described in the political science and political psychology literatures
as a relatively passive form of participation, being among the least demanding in terms of its human
capital requirements (e.g. Milbrath and Goel 1977; Verba and Nie 1987; Brady et al. 1995).3
The WVS also contains a large set of respondent biodata and characteristics. We use these as controls
in our regressions, namely age, gender, marital status, and number of children. A key explanatory variable
for our purposes will be the respondent's highest level of educational attainment. This is coded in the
WVS on a categorical scale that ranges from a low of 1 (\Inadequately completed elementary education")
to a high of 8 (\University with degree / Higher education - upper-level tertiary certicate"). While the
WVS makes a concerted attempt to standardize this coding, there are a number of lingering concerns
related to how consistently this has been recorded across countries with diverse education systems. In
our empirical section, we will thus discuss several checks that we performed to mitigate such worries.
Separately, we also require information on respondent income, in order to examine how economic
outcomes aect political participation. The WVS unfortunately does not report the actual income level
of each respondent, but instead records the within-country income decile to which she belongs. It is
nevertheless important to note that the local survey administrators determined beforehand the income
levels that would correspond to the decile thresholds, and then proceeded to ask respondents which
thresholds their income levels fell within, instead of asking respondents to make a subjective assessment
of their position in the income distribution.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the above political participation measures and respondent
3For example, Milbrath and Goel (1977) write: \The act of voting does not require as much information and motivation
as do most other political activities. Many people vote who are not politically involved, and conversely some who are
involved may not bother to vote" (pp.12-13).
5characteristics. Not surprisingly, respondents tend to report a lower propensity to engage in the protest
modes of political activity, such as \Occupy" (mean=0.151 on the 0-2 scale) and \Strike" (mean=0.280),
as compared to the less eort-intensive modes of participation, such as \Petition" (mean=0.884).4 There
is nevertheless a lot of variation in the data, as evidenced by the relatively large standard deviations
compared to the mean values for all of these participation measures.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
2.2 Empirical Specication
Our objective is to examine whether individuals who experience relatively poor labor market returns are
in fact more inclined to direct their human capital toward political activities. To address this, we pursue
an empirical strategy in two steps. We rst control for the role of respondent characteristics in explaining
income dierences across individuals. Intuitively, this allows us to infer a measure of the relative income
performance of each individual, when compared against other respondents from the same country with
similar biographical attributes (including age, education, and so on). In the second step, we then examine
whether individuals who exhibit worse income outcomes relative to their peers also dier systematically
in their patterns of political participation. We elaborate on this empirical strategy below.
We focus on relative income outcomes, as opposed to income levels per se, as this lets us capture two
important forces shaping the incentives toward political participation. On the one hand, participation
could be motivated by dissatisfaction (\grievance") with one's economic circumstances. Individuals
who under-perform economically, relative to what they could have expected to earn given personal
characteristics, can also be expected to be dissatised with the political establishment, on whom they
might pin the blame (rightly or wrongly) for their disappointing outcomes. This \relative deprivation"
{ relative to some benchmark or expectation { can function as a trigger for participation in social
movements or political activities (e.g., Walker and Smith 2002).
In addition, political participation can be aected by the fact that it competes for resources, and
human capital in particular, which could otherwise be directed toward production. Conceptually, if
income is derived from the production activities that one engages in, then the income residual would pick
up the eects of idiosyncratic determinants of worker productivity that are not directly predictable from
individual traits. These productivity shifters would in turn aect the individual's incentives to allocate
her human capital between labor market and political activities. Specically, individuals with a large
negative income residual (indicative of a negative productivity shock) can be expected to allocate human
4The pairwise correlations between \Demonstrate", \Occupy", \Boycott", \Strike", \Petition", \Discuss Politics", and
\Vote" are all positive, and range from a low of 0.0261 to a high of 0.5253. The political participation variables are thus far
from collinear.
6capital away from production toward politics instead. We provide a simple model in the Appendix that
eshes out this intuition more formally.5
Given the cross-sectional nature of the WVS data, a natural benchmark for relative performance
is to compare the income decile of each person against that predicted for other observationally similar
individuals. (Throughout this paper, this is the benchmark that we have in mind whenever we refer
to \relative" income outcomes.) This motivates the following regression specication, which sets out to
predict the income decile of individual i from country c in survey wave t as a function of a vector of
respondent characteristics, Vict. For each recorded level of education e 2 f1;:::;8g, we run this regression
for the subsample of respondents whose educational attainment, Educict, was equal to e:
IncDecict = 2;eVict + 3;eDct + ict;e: (1)
Here, Dct denotes a full set of country-survey wave dummies that absorbs the eects of average dierences
across countries and time. In words, for respondents at each level of educational attainment e, we regress
their income decile against a large set of personal characteristics and country-survey wave xed eects.
An advantage of this approach is that it allows the regression coecients, 2;e and 3;e, to dier exibly
across dierent education levels e, without imposing a parametric assumption with regard to how income
decile depends on education. We will thus refer to these as \Non-Parametric" residuals (with a slight
abuse of terminology).
In practice, given the categorical nature of the income dependent variable, we estimate (1) via ordered
logit. The results from these eight regressions are presented in full for interested readers in Appendix
Table 1, where we report standard errors clustered by country. The corresponding income residual
variable is then computed as:
IncResidict = IncDecict  
10 X
j=1
j  ^ Pr

IncDecict 2 Decile(j)

;
where ^ Pr
 
IncDecict 2 Decile(j)
is the predicted probability, from the estimation of (1), of the indi-
vidual's income falling in the j-th decile. Note that IncResidict is the union of the residuals generated
from the eight separate regressions in (1). This income residual variable turns out to be centered around
zero (to a rst approximation), but with a considerable amount of variation (almost two income deciles)
about that mean. To reiterate, this residual captures the extent to which an individual's actual income
decile exceeds that which one would expect on the basis of her level of education and other biographical
characteristics. In particular, a negative value of IncResidict indicates an actual income status below
5In particular, our modeling framework helps to clarify why it is more appropriate to use the income residual (IncResidict)
in our empirical strategy, rather than one's actual income decile (IncDecict): We cannot conclude that two individuals who
fall in the same income decile necessarily received the same productivity shock, unless we have already explicitly controlled
for the contribution of their biographical characteristics to their respective income outcomes.
7what would have been predicted, which we will interpret as an under-performance in income outcomes
for the individual in question.6
The vector of control variables, Vict, comprises dummy variables for: (i) gender; (ii) age groups (for
25-34, 35-64, :::, 65 and over, with 15-24 being the omitted category); (iii) number of children (for 1, 2,
..., 8 and over, with no children being the omitted category); and (iv) marital status (8 categories). This
allows us to control exibly for the eects of these observed traits on income outcomes. By including
this set of personal variables as well as country-survey wave dummies in (1), we eectively seek to
compare each respondent against the average income decile for individuals with similar characteristics
from the same country. Intuitively, we are not comparing retirees with young workers, but rather are
comparing individuals who are \close" along these observed lines. The controls also help to ensure that
any dierences in political engagement that we nd are likely associated with inherent dierences in the
income outcomes themselves, rather than being attributable to biographical characteristics that might
also get reected in incomes.7
We have separately considered several alternative ways of generating the income residual variable. A
more basic approach would be to include Educict as a right-hand side variable in a single regression that
pooled the observations across all levels of educational attainment:
IncDecict = 1Educict + 2Vict + 3Dct + ict: (2)
However, one concern with the above is that the \Pooled" income residuals thus calculated would end up
being a parametric function of schooling. This potentially introduces a mechanical correlation between
schooling and our empirical proxy of income under-performance, which could subsequently confound the
interpretation of our ndings. Yet another view is that the relevant comparison group for generating the
residuals should ignore income outcomes outside of one's own country. This would call for running the
following regression separately for each of the 148 country-survey waves (indexed by s):
IncDecict = 1;sEducict + 2;sVict + ict;s: (3)
A clear disadvantage of these \Country-Wave" residuals is that the coecient estimates from (3) are
less ecient than from our baseline \Non-Parametric" approach, as the latter are estimated o of more
observations (from across dierent countries). That said, it is reassuring that the core results in this
paper are preserved when using either the \Pooled" or \Country-Wave" versions of the income residual.8
6We have also estimated (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS). This yields income residuals that are highly correlated
with those generated via ordered logit, with the correlations being in excess of 0.99. Our ndings on the determinants of
political participation are thus very similar when the OLS-based income residuals are used instead (available on request).
7We have obtained very similar results (available on request) when further including separate sets of dummy variables
for employment status, occupation, and size of town in the vector of respondent characteristics, Vict. The rationale for
including these variables is however more questionable, as they can be seen as being proxies for income, so we have erred
on the side of caution by excluding them from our baseline.
8The correlation between any pair of these three income residual measures is in excess of 0.94.
8Having constructed our measure of relative income performance, the second step in our empirical
strategy then establishes how the income residual inuences patterns of political participation. We
pursue this with the following specication:
PolPartict = 1Educict + 2Educict  IncResidict + 3IncResidict
+4IncDecict + 5Vict + 6Dct + "ict: (4)
Equation (4) seeks to explain political participation at the individual level, PolPartict, as a function of
respondent characteristics, namely: (i) education; (ii) income decile; and (iii) the vector Vict of control
variables that entered earlier in our estimation of (1). Since our regression sample pools observations
across all WVS surveys, we include country-wave xed eects once again. The right-hand side also
includes our key terms of interest, namely the income residual measure, IncResidict, as well as its
interaction with education, EducictIncResidict. We thus explore whether relative income performance
has an eect on the level of one's political participation, and moreover whether this eect diers across
respondents with dierent schooling levels. The basic hypothesis that we test is whether 2 < 0: Are
highly-educated individuals who experience a poor relative income outcome (a more negative IncResidict)
in turn more inclined toward political activism?
We report standard errors clustered by country, to allow for possible correlated shocks that might
aect the behavior of respondents from the same country. In principle, these also need to be adjusted
further to take into account the use of the generated regressor, IncResidict. We have nevertheless com-
puted bootstrap standard errors (based on 100 bootstrap samples by country cluster) for the specication
in (4), and found that these were very similar in magnitude with no change to the statistical inference
drawn (see Appendix Table 2 for the full results). We thus report the more conventional standard errors
throughout the paper, given the computationally-intensive nature of the bootstrap procedure.
3 Findings on Political Protest at the Individual Level
3.1 Baseline Results
We report our baseline ndings in Table 2. In the upper panel, we rst show the results from estimating
(4) without the interaction term, Educict  IncResidict, between individual education and the income
residual. We present the results for each political participation measure in a separate column. Since the
dependent variables are again categorical in nature, we estimate the regressions using ordered logit. The
one exception to this is in Column 5. There, we use the rst principal component of \Demonstrate",
\Occupy", \Boycott", and \Strike" as our dependent variable, and perform the estimation via ordinary
least squares (OLS) instead. The rst principal component provides a convenient way to summarize the
9common patterns underlying these four protest-related variables, while ltering out the noise that might
be specic to any single measure.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Across all columns, note that the coecient on individual schooling is always positive and statistically
signicant, conrming the stylized fact in the extensive literature on the role of education as a determinant
of political participation. Turning to the direct eect of the income residual variable, we nd that its
coecient is typically negative, but is only signicant in three out of the eight columns. While this
indicates that individuals with relatively weak income outcomes appear more likely to engage in political
activities, the strength of this evidence is not particularly striking.
We move on to the estimation of (4), including the interaction term of interest on the right-hand side.
The lower panel of Table 2 now points strongly to a role for the income residual when it is considered in
tandem with the respondent's level of schooling. Our main result centers on the negative and signicant
2 coecient on Educict  IncResidict that we obtain for \Demonstrate", \Occupy", \Boycott", and
\Strike" (Columns 1-4), as well as for their rst principal component (Column 5). Since these regressions
control for country-survey wave xed eects, we can interpret this as evidence that within each country-
wave, more educated individuals whose incomes nevertheless fall short of what would be expected on
the basis of their biographical traits are indeed signicantly more likely to engage in protest modes of
political expression. On the other hand, Columns 6-8 show that any such interaction eect of the income
residual with schooling is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the civic modes of participation,
namely \Petition", \Discuss Politics", and \Vote".9
We provide here a preliminary sense of the size of the eects that are implied. It is most convenient
to explore this using the Column 5 specication, which uses the rst principal component measure.
For a one standard deviation decrease in the income residual (equal to 1.967), we ask how much more
inclined toward protest activity an individual with tertiary education would be relative to someone with
incomplete primary education. The associated change in the dependent variable is:  0:005171:967 =
 0:070, or about 5% of a standard deviation of the rst principal component. As a comparison, the main
eect from raising education in this way is: 0:06787 = 0:475, which is closer to one-third of a standard
deviation in the measure of political participation. While the size of our interaction eect thus appears to
be modest, we shall see later that the magnitudes implied are larger in our more thorough specications.
9The results are essentially unaltered if we control for an additional interaction term between respondent education and
one's income decile, conrming that what is driving the propensity toward political protest is in fact comparisons of one's
income against what would be expected for observationally similar individuals. See Appendix Table 3.
103.2 Robustness
We now include a series of further control variables, in order to conrm the robustness of our core ndings.
It turns out that our results remain intact, if not in fact being strengthened.
In Table 3, we include on the right-hand side of (4) interaction terms between individual education
and income decile (Educict IncDecict), as well as between individual education and the set of country-
survey wave dummies (Educict  Dct). The former seeks to ascertain that what matters for patterns of
political protest is indeed the income residual, as opposed to one's actual income decile. The latter set of
controls is motivated by the evidence in Campante and Chor (2012a), who show that underlying features
of the country can systematically inuence the responsiveness of political participation to education at the
individual level. In particular, they nd that various proxies for the returns to skill at the country level
tend to dampen the positive association seen between political engagement and individual schooling.
The Educict  Dct terms therefore provide a exible way to control for the mediating eects of such
country characteristics, without which the estimated coecient of Educict  IncResidict is potentially
exposed to omitted variables bias. As displayed in Table 3, our results are indeed robust to the inclusion
of this extensive set of controls for each of the ve political protest variables.10 Once again, no negative
interaction eect is found with the two civic participation variables, \Petition" and \Discuss Politics".
Interestingly, the pattern for \Vote" starts to resemble more that which we have seen for the protest
variables, as the 2 coecient in Column 8 is now negative and signicant. Note moreover that the
implied size of the interaction eect of interest on the propensity toward protest is now much larger
relative to the corresponding Table 2 baselines. In Column 5 for example, a one standard deviation
drop in the income residual for an individual with complete university education relative to one with
incomplete elementary schooling would imply a change of:  0:0215  7  1:967 =  0:296, or about a
decrease of one-fth of a standard deviation for the rst principal component.11
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The above stylized fact continues to stand out even when we perform a number of checks related to
the income residual measure itself. We earlier discussed two alternative estimating equations from which
we generated the \Pooled" and \Country-Wave" versions of the income residuals. It turns out that our
results are reassuringly similar across these dierent ways of constructing IncResidict; these are reported
in Appendix Tables 4 and 5 respectively, where the regressions run are based on the full specication
10The reader may be concerned that the coecient of Educict here is no longer always positive and signicant. Bear in
mind however that with the inclusion of the Educict  Dct terms, the coecient of Educict loses its interpretation as the
average direct eect of individual schooling on political participation across all country-waves.
11We have veried that our results are similar when splitting the sample into countries with below (respectively above)
median values of the Polity IV democracy score. Separate regression tables for the dierent regions of the world are also
available on request.
11from Table 3. Returning to our \Non-Parametric" residuals, a next natural concern is that outlier values
might be driving our ndings, given the large dispersion in this variable that we have already noted.
Once again, for the protest-related dependent variables in Columns 1-5, the statistical signicance of
the negative 2 coecient is largely similar even after we drop both the upper and lower tail 5% of
IncResidict values for either the whole sample or within each country-survey wave (see Appendix Tables
6 and 7 respectively).
We implemented a further, more stringent test to ascertain that the income residual is indeed captur-
ing economically meaningful information. We did this through a permutation test, in which we randomly
reallocated the IncResidict values across individuals within each country-survey wave while keeping all
other personal characteristics unaltered, and then re-ran the regression specications from Columns 1-5
of Table 3. This was done for 500 independent sets of permutations of the income residual, to examine
how frequently the coecient on Educict  IncResidict turned up negative and statistically signicant.
If signicant results are common, this would be grounds for concern that our results were ascribable to
mere chance. It turns out that for each of the protest variables (\Demonstrate", \Occupy", \Boycott",
\Strike", and their rst principal component), only a small share { between 1.8% and 3.4% { of the 500
regressions based on permuted income residuals yielded a 2 coecient that was negative and signicant
at the 5% level. Of note, even when the 2 coecient from a set of permuted residuals was signicant,
it was always smaller in magnitude than the corresponding coecient in Table 3 obtained with the true
IncResidict variable. We view this as striking evidence that our income residuals do contain useful
information about individual-specic conditions that aect income outcomes.
A separate set of concerns relates to how the education variable is measured in the WVS. There are
natural diculties associated with mapping levels of educational attainment across dierent countries
onto a single 1-8 categorical scale. While any such measurement error should in principle attenuate
the estimated eects of education and its interaction with the income residual, we have nevertheless
undertaken a few further exercises. First, in several countries such as Germany and Japan, technical
and vocational education is often regarded on par with secondary education of a university-preparatory
nature, whereas the WVS coding implicitly ranks the latter above the former. We thus experimented
with a shorter coding of the education variable based on a 1-6 scale, in which both forms of secondary
education were combined into the same coding.12 We then re-computed the income residuals and re-ran
our analysis using this recoded education variable (see Appendix Table 8). Second, in our regressions on
the determinants of political participation, we have been treating the 1-8 education scale as essentially
12Specically, the recoded categories are: 1 = Inadequately completed elementary; 2 = Completed elementary; 3 =
Incomplete secondary (either technical/vocational or university-preparatory); 4 = Completed secondary (either techni-
cal/vocational or university-preparatory); 5 = Some university without degree or lower-level tertiary certicate; 6 = Uni-
versity with degree or upper-level tertiary certicate.
12a linear variable. However, this may not provide an accurate reection of the actual resources that are
invested in acquiring that education. We have thus also looked at how robust our results are when
replacing the education variable with the age at which one completed (or expected to complete) one's
education, this being question X023 in the WVS (see Appendix Table 9).13 Finally, we also individually
cross-checked the education variable against the country-specic descriptions of education levels where
available (question X025CS). We dropped those countries for which there were discrepancies, before
repeating our analysis using \Non-Parametric" residuals computed o the smaller country sample (see
Appendix Table 10).14 Reassuringly, our overall conclusion on the negative interaction eect involving
individual education and the income residual for the protest modes of political participation is never
overturned.
As a nal robustness check, we ask whether our results continue to hold when controlling more
extensively for the role of age and demography, this being motivated by earlier work that has identied
a correlation between \youth bulges" and political violence (Urdal 2006). Note that our regressions so
far have already included age group dummies in the respondent controls. Nevertheless, one could be
concerned that the role of age needs to be considered in tandem with income under-performance, namely
that younger individuals who experience relatively poor income outcomes could be more inclined to
protest. Table 4 explores this alternative thesis, by further adding the interactions between each of the age
group dummies and IncResidict to the right-hand side of the Table 3 specications. The results conrm
that what matters more is individual education as opposed to age per se: The Educict  IncResidict
interactions remain negative and signicant for the protest modes of participation (Columns 1-5), except
in Column 2 for \Occupy" where it is marginally insignicant. Conversely, no consistent pattern is
detected for the interactions involving the younger age categories. Since the 15-24 age cohort is the
omitted category, the coecient of IncResidict is itself the average eect of the income residual for this
youngest age group. We also examine whether the interaction eect for the age 25-34 cohort (summing
across the coecients of IncResidict and Age 25-34  IncResidict) is dierent from zero; the p-value
from this test is reported in a separate row in Table 4. For both of these youthful cohorts, we do not
nd signicant evidence that a more negative income residual is associated with a greater propensity
toward protest, except when \Demonstrate" is the dependent variable (Column 1). Although the \youth
revolt" story might be useful for understanding specic episodes of political protest, the role of individual
education and income under-performance is clearly still relevant in the broader cross-country survey data.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
13Note that this issue is not a concern for the rst step of our empirical strategy, since the education scale is not assumed
to be linear when the \Non-Parametric" income residuals are generated. We thus only replace the education variable with
the age of education completion in the second step where we seek to explain patterns of political participation.
14The countries/territories dropped were: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Uganda, USA, and Zimbabwe.
13In sum, the evidence points to a signicant negative interaction eect between individual schooling
and relative income outcomes on the propensity toward political protest: Individuals with a higher level
of education are more likely to translate their human capital into political protest when their income
falls short of what one would expect from their characteristics.
3.3 Interpretation
What mechanisms can explain this key empirical regularity? Our ndings are open to a number of
potential interpretations, three of which we now turn to discuss at more length.
A rst interpretation draws on the \resource" view of political participation. The key idea here is that
eort-intensive forms of political activity are a competing use of productive human capital. We develop
this idea formally in the Model Appendix, but the core intuition is straightforward to convey. We start
from the premise that education acts to expand an individual's capacity to engage in all tasks.15 In other
words, schooling raises the eective units of labor that the individual possesses, which she subsequently
decides how to allocate between production and political activities. In earlier work in Campante and
Chor (2012a), we developed a model along such lines. There, we showed that an economic environment
where the returns to using human capital in market production are low, for example because of a scarcity
of factors of production that are complementary to human capital, would naturally incline individuals
toward devoting more of their human capital to political participation. This response should moreover
be stronger for those with more education, given the larger amount of eective labor that they have at
their disposal.
We can extend this basic logic, as we do in our Model Appendix, to show that the same insights
are true when the low returns to labor are specic to the individual, as opposed to being features of
the aggregate economic environment. For example, an individual who suers a negative shock to her
productivity in the workplace would face the same incentive to shift human capital toward political
participation instead. To the extent that the income residual serves as a proxy for these productivity
shocks, the mechanism just described would match the patterns which we have uncovered in the data.
Of note, this logic provides a possible rationalization for why the key interaction eects are present
for protest modes of participation, but not for \softer", more civic forms such as signing a petition or
discussing politics. In principle, the tradeo regarding the use of one's human capital should be especially
acute for protest activities, which are more demanding of one's time and eort, so that the propensity
toward political protest would be more sensitive to the productivity shocks that one experiences.
A second complementary interpretation of our ndings centers around \disaection", or what we
15This harks back to a point raised by Frey (1971) to address the apparent paradox on why high-income individuals (who
presumably should have a high opportunity cost of time) nevertheless exhibit higher levels of political participation: Such
individuals are typically also more productive in their political engagement.
14term a \grievance" eect. As earlier discussed, individuals could develop a sense of personal grievance
if they under-perform in the labor market relative to what they could have expected to earn given
their personal characteristics, and this could well have ramications for political engagement. If it is
also the case that individuals with more schooling are more prone to react to poor income outcomes,
and that such grievances are disproportionately manifest through eort-intensive modes of participation
(namely, protest), this could then account for the interaction eects which we have documented. This
interpretation is in fact quite natural, in light of the fact that grievance motives have received a fair bit
of attention in the literature on political participation (e.g., Verba et al. 1987; Opp 1988).
That said, we can attempt to assess the relevance of the grievance eect for our results by going back
to the data. The WVS contains several questions which gauge each respondent's degree of satisfaction
with the political establishment in their country, thus providing us with an opportunity to control directly
for potential grievance motives in our regressions. Specically, respondents were asked to rate the degree
of condence that they had in their government (question E079). We recoded the answers to generate
the variable ConfidenceGovtict along the following scale: \None at all" (response=0), \Not very much"
(=1), \Quite a lot" (=2), and \A great deal" (=3). Low scores in ConfidenceGovtict would arguably
correlate with a greater sense of unhappiness with the performance of the incumbent.
Table 5 displays the results from re-running the specications from Table 3, after including this
measure and its interaction with individual schooling as further right-hand side variables. The former
would account for the direct eect of the grievance motive on individual political participation, while the
interaction term addresses the possibility that this grievance eect may be heterogeneous across dierent
levels of education. The point estimates obtained for this latter interaction coecient do suggest that
more educated individuals who express less condence in their government appear more likely to engage
in political protest, but the statistical signicance of these eects is generally weak. At the same time,
our core results for the negative EducictIncResidict interaction are largely unaected, relative to what
we had seen in Table 3.16 In sum, the above exploration suggests that while there may well be a role
for grievances, these do not appear to fully account for the connection between schooling, economic
under-performance, and political protest which we consistently continue to nd in the data.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
A third potential interpretation is that our ndings may be the result of self-selection, rather than
16The WVS contains another survey question (E125) which can be viewed as an alternative proxy for political grievance.
This asks respondents to rate their satisfaction \with the way the people now in national oce are handling the country's
aairs". From this, we coded a variable SatisfactionGovtict as follows: \Very dissatised" (=0), \Fairly dissatised" (=1),
\Fairly satised" (=2), and \Very satised" (=3). The key disadvantage of this variable is that it is available for fewer
countries, and we lose about a quarter of our observations. Similarly, we can proxy more specically for \economic grievance"
by using the responses provided to WVS question C006, where surveyees were asked to rate on a scale of one to ten how
satised they were with the nancial situation of their household. The results obtained with these alternative measures are
nevertheless very similar to that in Table 5 (available on request).
15necessarily reecting a causal link. Specically, some individuals might by their nature be more inclined
toward protest activities, and this would in turn aect their decisions on human capital acquisition as
well as their subsequent labor market outcomes. For example, such individuals could be led both to
acquire more education { if for example universities are seen as hotbeds of activism { and to fare worse
than their peers in their income outcomes { since they might self-select into careers that are aligned with
their political interests, even if these do not deliver the highest labor market returns.
A natural approach to explore the relevance of this story would be to try to control directly for
individual attributes that are plausibly correlated with any such inherent proclivity toward protest. Along
these lines, it would clearly be useful to control for the intensity of one's ideological inclinations. The
WVS contains several questions that help in this regard. Specically, WVS respondents are asked about
their political positioning, to identify where they stand on a one to ten left- to right-wing ideological scale
(question E033). We use this to create an extremism variable, PolExtremismict, which is computed as
the absolute value of the dierence between one's self-reported political position and 5.5 (the median of the
scale). We allow for the eects of political extremism to dier between left- and right-wing respondents,
by multiplying PolExtremismict with dummy variables for whether one's self-reported ideology lies
between 1 and 5 or between 6 and 10 respectively. In addition, we make use of information on religiosity
(question F034). We code this variable, Religiosityict, as follows: \An atheist" (response=0), \Not a
religious person" (=1), and \A religious person" (=2).
Table 6 shows that our results are not aected when we augment the specications from Table 3
with these controls for political extremism and religiosity, together with their respective interactions
with schooling. Thus, even after controlling as best we can for personal characteristics that might be
correlated with an intrinsic propensity to engage in protests, the interaction between individual schooling
and the income residual remains a signicant explanatory variable for patterns of political protest. We
have also examined what happens when we include the political extremism and religiosity variables as
additional explanatory variables for one's income decile in the rst step of our empirical strategy, since
these traits may well aect a person's income outcomes following the logic of the self-selection story.
Reassuringly, the negative and signicant eects of Educict  IncResidict on political protest in the
Table 6 specications are not aected when using this alternatively-generated income residual variable
(see Appendix Table 11). While the limitations of our empirical setting prevent us from ruling out other
possible non-causal stories, these results suggest that the relationships we have found are unlikely to be
due solely to the self-selecting behavior of ideologically-extreme individuals.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
To sum up our presentation of the survey-based evidence, we should be clear in acknowledging that
16all three interpretations we have discussed are not mutually exclusive, as they could all very well be
at play in reality. What these additional exercises do suggest though is that grievance motives and the
self-selection story alone are unlikely to be the sole explanations behind the empirical patterns of political
protest which we have uncovered.
4 Schooling, Political Turnover, and the Economy
We turn next to ask whether the eects which we have found in the individual-level data have aggregate
implications, at the country level. If the combination of high schooling levels and weak economic prospects
is associated with a higher frequency and intensity of protest activity, one might by extension expect that
this combination of conditions, if present at the country level, would also negatively impact the stability
of the incumbent government.
4.1 Country Data
To explore the above question, we use turnover data on country leaders compiled from Worldstates-
men.org, an encyclopedia that provides detailed chronologies of heads of state and heads of government
around the world. As a source of information, Worldstatesmen.org is extremely comprehensive and up-
to-date, with political changes in real-time typically being updated within a week. In addition, political
changes that are of a transitional nature (such as an acting president) are all recorded with the ocial
dates of the delegation of power. We extend this data, originally compiled by Campante et al. (2009),
to cover the 1976-2010 period.17 To guard against possible concerns over the open-source nature of the
website, we have compared the records in WorldStatesmen.org against Beck at al.'s (2001) Database of
Political Institutions (DPI), as a cross-check for the years in which political transitions occurred.
Our primary measure of incumbent turnover is the number of times there was a change in country
chief executive during a given ve-year window, say 2001-2005. (We adopt this as the unit of time in
the analysis, since the education data, as described below, is only available at ve-year intervals.) This
can equivalently be viewed as a measure of the frequency of changes in the executive. For corroborating
evidence, we also consider as an alternative a binary variable coded equal to 1 if any change in country
chief executive took place during each ve-year window. (Note that our total sample contains seven such
ve-year periods, from 1976-1980 to 2006-2010.)
We use data on country-level schooling attainment from the latest version of the Barro and Lee
(2010) dataset. This provides information at ve-year intervals, including a breakdown by age cohorts.
To capture the prevalence of higher levels of schooling in the population, we use the average years of
17Although it is possible to extend the turnover data further back in time, we opted not to do this given the large number
of countries that had yet to gain independence prior to 1975.
17secondary education in the population aged 25 and above.18 We will also look at measures of primary
and tertiary schooling (analogously dened) for comparison. We prefer to use variables that apply to
those aged 25 and above since these should better reect nal schooling outcomes after any investments
in secondary and tertiary education have been undertaken.
The remaining variables are from standard sources of country data. We take the total population
gures and real GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables (Version 7.0), while we rely on the Barro-Lee
dataset for the breakdown of population shares by age cohort. Summary statistics for the cross-country
variables are reported in Table 7.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
4.2 Determinants of Political Turnover
Building on our ndings with the individual-level data, we hypothesize an analogous interaction eect:
Incumbents will be more threatened when a highly-educated population is faced with economic conditions
in which their human capital is not rewarded well in production activities.
In order to connect to our earlier analysis, we start o by proxying for economic performance using the
median income residual variable from the WVS data. Specically, we take the income residual measures
from before, and compute the median value of IncResidict across individuals with an education score of at
least 5 (some secondary education of a pre-university nature), separately for each available country-survey
wave. A country with a very negative median income residual can thus be viewed as one where under-
performance in income outcomes is widespread among the relatively educated.19 In practice, however, we
are unable to use the within-country variation in this median residual measure, as the existing country
coverage of the WVS across dierent survey waves would leave us with a short and unbalanced panel. We
therefore focus on the cross-country variation in this measure, by using only the median income residual
calculated from the most recent WVS wave for each country.20
This yields the following specication:
Turnoverct = 0Turnoverc;t 1 + 1Y rsSecc;t 1 + 2Y rsSecc;t 1  MedIncResidc + 3MedIncResidc
+Dt + ct; (5)
where Turnover, Y rsSec and MedIncResid denote respectively the measures of incumbent turnover
(the number of executive changes), education (average years of secondary schooling), and the median
18We found similar results using the share of the population aged 25 and above with at least some secondary schooling
(available upon request).
19We use the median rather than the mean value, since the distribution of the income residuals within each country-wave
often displays a fair amount of skew.
20We merge this with the data on political turnover, by associating the median residual from Wave 2 (1989-1993), Wave 3
(1994-1999), Wave 4 (1999-2004), and Wave 5 (2004-2008) to the 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010 windows
respectively.
18income residual. Note that the subscript c stands for country, whereas t now refers to each ve-year
window in our data. In practice, we examine whether initial education (say, in 2000) helps to explain
incumbent turnover in the subsequent ve-year window (namely, in 2001-2005). We further allow for
persistence in political instability, by including a lagged Turnoverc;t 1 term on the right-hand side of the
estimating equation. The Dt are a set of time dummies, to control for the possible eects of broad waves
of political turbulence, such as following the fall of the Berlin Wall or the recent Arab World revolts, that
might raise the probability of incumbent turnover across many countries during a given period in time.
Given that our dependent variable is an integer count, we estimate (5) using a Poisson regression model.
This yields a point estimate of ^ 2 =  1:070, with a robust standard error of 0:399, which is signicant
at the 1% level. This provides preliminary but nevertheless suggestive evidence that countries where
relatively educated individuals faced favorable economic circumstances were also less likely to experience
threats to the stability of the government.21
However, the exercise based on (5) has inherent limitations. The absence of time variation means
that we cannot make inferences related to within-country developments over time, for example whether
a given country's investment in schooling, when combined with a period of poor economic performance,
is more likely to augur a period of increased incumbent instability. Put dierently, it would be useful for
us to be able to include country xed eects, in order to control for the eects of unobserved country
characteristics that do not change over time.
This motivates our use of real GDP per capita as an alternative measure of prevailing economic
conditions, under the assumption that periods where income per capita is high would be associated
with a relative abundance of well-paying labor market opportunities. While this is admittedly a broader
proxy, it nevertheless allows us to work with a more balanced data panel. It also has the important
advantage of allowing for a more direct comparison with the vast literature cited in our Introduction that
has studied the joint evolution of GDP per capita, political institutions, and education, in the context of
the modernization hypothesis. We thus run the following analogous specication:
Turnoverct = ~ 0Turnoverc;t 1 + ~ 1Y rsSecc;t 1 + ~ 2Y rsSecc;t 1  GDPpcc;t 1 + ~ 3GDPpcc;t 1
+~ 4Vc;t 1 + Dc + Dt + ~ ct; (6)
where the political turnover and education variables are dened as before, and GDPpc refers to log
real GDP per capita; V is a vector of additional country controls. To be consistent with the timing of
Educ, we use lagged measures for GDPpc and V (say, an average over 1996-2000) to explain turnover in
21For completeness, the other coecient estimates and their associated robust standard errors (in parentheses) are as
follows: ^ 0 = 0:131 (0:102), ^ 1 = 0:003 (0:094), and ^ 3 = 4:143 (1:243). Of these, only ^ 3 is statistically signicant. It is also
useful to note that the signicance of the 2 coecient is robust to controlling further for log population and its interaction
with country education, as well as for the interaction between country education and time xed eects, these being controls
that we will use later in Tables 8 and 9.
19the subsequent period (namely, 2001-2005); the results are very similar if we use the contemporaneous
ve-year averaged values as controls instead. The regression now includes both country (Dc) and time
(Dt) xed eects. We will moreover cluster the standard errors to allow for correlated shocks in the error
term at the country level.
For the sake of robustness, we have also experimented with replacing GDP per capita in the speci-
cation in (6) with a real \GDP per capita residual". This is motivated by an analogy with our earlier
individual-level analysis, and represents an attempt to extract a country-level productivity shock. That
said, it is not obvious from a conceptual point of view how individual-level productivity shocks would
aggregate up to the country level, and we also have relatively little guidance as to what observed country
variables one should control for. In practice, we computed a \GDP per capita residual" by running an
OLS regression of log real GDP per capita on country measures of education (years of primary, secondary,
and tertiary schooling, as described earlier) and demography (log population, and the share of the pop-
ulation aged 15-64).22 A separate cross-country regression was run for the observations from each 5-year
window in our dataset. One can loosely interpret the residual obtained from this as capturing how the
economy was performing relative to what one might have expected from basic schooling and demographic
characteristics. In light of the caveats we have raised though, we necessarily view the evidence from this
\GDP per capita residual" as being more corroborative in nature.23
The results for our key specication in (6) using log real GDP per capita are displayed in Table 8; our
conclusions are essentially unchanged when using the \GDP per capita residual" instead (see Appendix
Table 12).24 Column 1 reports a basic Poisson regression with our main interaction term of interest.
The ndings here are exactly in line with our working hypothesis: Increases in schooling are associated
with a greater frequency of incumbent turnover (~ 1 > 0), but this eect is dampened when the country's
economic performance is strong (~ 2 < 0). In other words, when economic conditions are weak, high levels
of educational attainment can be especially threatening to incumbent stability. Column 2 adds further
explanatory variables on the right-hand side, in the form of log country population and its interaction
with education, in order to verify that our central result on the ~ 2 coecient is not driven by country
scale eects. We also include education interacted with a full set of time xed eects, to accommodate
the possibility that certain periods may be characterized by a heightened response of educated individuals
to political action across dierent countries, such as was seen during the Arab Spring. Our main results
22The population share variable is computed from the Barro-Lee dataset as the share of the population aged 15 and above
that is in the 15-64 age group.
23It is interesting to note that the median WVS income residual for the 71-country sample in regression (5) is weakly
positively correlated with log real GDP per capita (0.1098), but is instead negatively correlated with the \GDP per capita
residual" ( 0.1088). This suggests that the latter residual variable may not necessarily be the better proxy of how individual-
level productivity shocks aggregate up at the country level.
24The one exception is that we lose the negative interaction eect in the logit specication in Column 7 of Table 8, where
the dependent variable is the dummy variable for the occurrence of a change in executive.
20are clearly robust to these, with the point estimate for ~ 2 now larger in magnitude.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
Column 3 compares the importance of dierent levels of educational attainment. We use as additional
explanatory variables the average years of primary and tertiary schooling (in the population aged 25 and
over), together with their respective interactions with log GDP per capita. The results suggest that it is
higher levels of schooling, in particular secondary schooling, that matter the most for political outcomes
at the country level. It is perhaps not too surprising that we do not see an eect of primary schooling,
since the skills imparted at the primary level deal more with basic numeracy and literacy, as opposed to
preparing students for the labor market. We however do not see a signicant eect for tertiary education
also, although this could be due to the smaller cross-country variation in this specic schooling measure
(see Table 7).25
We address the \youth revolution" hypothesis in Column 4, following up on our earlier discussion
on the possible connection between large youth cohorts and protest movements. To do so, we control
for the respective shares of the population aged between 15-24 and between 25-39 (as a share of the
total population aged 15 and over), as well as their interactions with country log GDP per capita.
Our main coecient of interest { on the interaction between secondary schooling and GDP per capita
(~ 2) { is now less precisely estimated, although it is still negative and broadly consistent with the
estimates from previous columns. The results do indicate that a larger age 25-39 cohort is associated
with more incumbent turnover during periods when country income is lower, but there is no evidence
of an analogous eect for the younger age 15-24 cohort. This is consistent with the idea that broader
economic conditions matter more for the incumbent, insofar as they aect the prospects of those in the
slightly older, economically active 25-39 age bracket who would arguably be more immediately concerned
about their labor market prospects.
Our ndings on the importance of the ~ 2 coecient are restored when we apply dynamic panel
techniques to estimate this specication. Although this means that we are now viewing (6) as a linear
model, such techniques are still useful to consider since it has been observed that political institutions
tend to persist over time, which increases the stringency of the requirements for the consistency of the
xed-eects estimator; this may matter more in our setting, given the short time dimension of our panel
with just seven periods. Column 5 reports the results from the Arellano and Bond (1991) procedure,
which uses lagged levels of the right-hand side variables as instruments in a rst-dierenced version of
(6).26 Column 6 then further includes time-dierenced variables as additional instruments to estimate a
25An alternative interpretation is that workers with tertiary education might be less vulnerable to bad economic shocks
at the country level.
26We use one period of the lagged dependent variable in Columns 5 and 6. Both regressions pass the usual diagnostics
21levels version of equation (6), which in principle yields more ecient estimates (Arellano and Bover 1995,
Blundell and Bond 1998). Our key negative interaction eect between secondary schooling and country
income levels is now found to be highly signicant and much larger in magnitude.
Last but not least, we examine the use of our alternative, binary measure of political turnover. This
is useful to consider, since our count variable may be over-stating the extent of real political instability
with the mechanical count rule that we adopted. Reassuringly, we obtain results in the logit specication
in Column 7 that are very consistent with those seen in the preceding columns. It is also interesting to
compare the magnitudes of the eects implied for the schooling and population share variables. Consider
for example the impact of a one standard deviation increase in average years of secondary schooling that
is also accompanied by a one standard deviation fall in log real GDP per capita. Using the Column 7
estimates, this would imply a rise in the log odds of seeing a change in executive of 0:6621:3101:311 =
1:137. This is about twice as large as the corresponding marginal eect that would be predicted for a
similar one standard deviation increase in the population share of the age 25-39 cohort, which is given
by: 0:106  4:198  1:311 = 0:583.27
In sum, using a variety of estimation methods and measures, we have found that the combination
of increased levels of secondary schooling and poor macroeconomic performance tends to be associated
with a greater frequency of incumbent turnover. The role of schooling in this regard (as a determinant
of political turnover) appears to be quantitatively larger than the corresponding role played by youth
bulges, although these results need to be interpreted cautiously in light of the caveats associated with
identifying causal relationships with cross-country data.
4.3 Determinants of Democracy
A potential limitation of our analysis based on the executive turnover measures is that our coding of these
variables does not dierentiate between peaceful and non-peaceful political change. Given our emphasis
on protest modes of political participation, one could argue that we should be concerned primarily with
instances where the removal of an incumbent was accompanied by protest movements and even conict.
We did not pursue this approach in part because it inherently entails subjective judgement calls regarding
events surrounding each episode of change. For example, even peaceful changes in political leadership
that are in line with constitutional procedures may be undertaken as a result of negative public opinion
that threatens to spill over into demonstrations and protests.
We nevertheless oer evidence in this subsection that substantial political and institutional change
for possible model misspecication. As reported in the tables, we reject the null hypothesis of no rst-order autocorrelation
in the rst-dierenced errors, but do not nd evidence against the null of no second-order autocorrelation. We do not use
the Sargan overidentication test, as the properties of this test have not been established when the standard errors are
heteroskedastic. Note that we report robust standard errors in all the dynamic panel specications in Tables 8 and 9.
27In these exercises, we use a one standard deviation change calculated from the sample of 644 observations in Column 7.
22does appear to ensue from periods in which economic conditions fail to keep up with the education prole
of the population. Specically, we consider the commonly-used Polity IV democracy score (Marshall and
Jaggers 2010) as a dependent variable, and ask: Does the combination of increased levels of schooling
and a weak macroeconomy entail an opportunity not only for leadership change, but also for democ-
ratization? These questions are also interesting given their connection with the large body of work on
the \modernization hypothesis", in particular the idea that education is a pre-condition for democracy:
They underscore the possibility that this link might be conditioned by economic circumstances.
Table 9 sheds light on this issue. We estimate the specication in (6) using instead a ve-year average
of the 0-10 democracy score as the dependent variable; unless otherwise stated, these are run with OLS
using explanatory variables that are one-period lags. These regressions take on a similar avor to the
recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2005, 2008, 2009), which considers the role of education and income
separately as determinants of democratization using a similar cross-country panel context.28 While the
regressions here focus on log real GDP per capita as the country measure of income, we can report that
the results are very similar when using the \GDP per capita residual" instead (see Appendix Table 13).
Our shortest specication in Column 1 of Table 9 shows essentially no eect of either schooling or income
on democracy, consistent with the above-cited studies which tend to nd no evidence for such an eect
once country dummies are included in the specication.29 Interestingly, however, we obtain a negative
and signicant interaction eect for the combination of schooling and income per capita once this is
introduced into the model (Column 2). This nding survives the same set of sensitivity checks which we
had imposed in Table 8, namely controlling for the role of total population, education interacted with
population, and education by year xed eects (Column 3), the roles of primary and tertiary education
(Column 4), as well as the youth cohort size hypothesis (Column 5). Note in particular that it is once
again secondary schooling (relative to other education grades) that appears to matter most for subsequent
democratization.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
The nal two columns explore the use of dynamic panel GMM estimation.30 We rst consider
the Arellano-Bond procedure in Column 6, followed by the Arellano-Bover / Blundell-Bond method in
Column 7.31 Our key results remain robust, with in fact a much larger coecient estimate for the
28This builds on earlier work in this vein by Barro (1999) and Przeworski et al. (2000), among others.
29Glaeser et al. (2007) nd a similar result with country xed eects, but show that a positive eect of education on
democratization is recovered if one considers less persistent measures of schooling investment, such as enrollment.
30Note that we now use two periods of the lagged dependent variable in this estimation. This is because the one-period
lag model is rejected by the autocorrelation diagnostics, but the two-period lag model is not. The main nding of a negative
and signicant interaction between secondary schooling and log income is not sensitive to this choice of lagged models.
31The increased eciency of the latter estimator could be important in this context. For example, Bobba and Coviello
(2007) contend that the signicance of the link from schooling to democracy is restored once the Arellano-Bover / Blundell-
Bond procedure is applied.
23negative eect of secondary schooling interacted with income. In terms of implied magnitudes, the
estimates in Column 7 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in secondary schooling (1:401
years), coupled with a similar fall in income per capita (1:259 log units), would be associated with an
increase in democracy score of slightly over 1 point on the 10 point scale (0:6321:4011:259 = 1:115),
or just above a quarter of a standard deviation in the regression sample.
The above evidence therefore suggests that while the cocktail of increased schooling and poor economic
opportunities is potentially threatening to incumbent stability, it actually tends to be accompanied by
moves toward greater democratization.
5 Conclusion
This paper has sought to uncover broader lessons on the link between human capital, economic outcomes,
and political protest. At the individual level, we have found in the WVS data that respondents whose
income under-performs that predicted on the basis of their biographical characteristics are more inclined
to apply their human capital toward protest activities, such as demonstrations, strikes, and the occupation
of buildings. We discussed possible interpretations for this empirical pattern, including the idea that there
is a tradeo between the productive and political uses of human capital. We also do not rule out the
possible role of grievance eects or self-selecting behavior, although we would add that these alone are
unlikely to fully account for our empirical ndings.
We have also examined the country-level data, and found evidence that countries that have raised
educational attainment, but failed to see that investment matched with commensurate rises in economic
opportunities or living standards, are more likely to see political incumbents removed from oce. The
evidence indicates that such circumstances are often also associated with subsequent improvements in
democratic institutions.
Given the nature of our analysis, we clearly do not intend our regression models to be used to provide
conclusive forecasts for the outcomes in specic country cases. Notwithstanding this, we believe the
evidence is informative about the economic underpinnings of political protest, and what it means for
the incumbents who face it. We would moreover argue that these ndings highlight the usefulness of
taking a more nuanced view that moves beyond the debate on whether education determines political
development or democratization, toward studying instead the conditions under which this determination
or inuence is more (or less) likely to hold true.
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27Model Appendix
This Appendix presents a model of individual behavior in which human capital is allocated between
production and political activities, building on that in Campante and Chor (2012a). We use the model
to better understand the forces that shape the tradeos that individuals face when making this human
capital allocation decision, with a specic focus on the eects of shocks to an individual's productivity in
the production sector. While the model is admittedly stylized, it nevertheless provides a framework that
motivates our empirical strategy, illustrating in particular why our empirical income residual reasonably
captures the role of productivity shocks at the individual level.
Consider a setting in which individuals derive utility from two activities: (i) consumption, c, which
is denominated in monetary units; and (ii) political participation, x, which is denoted in units of human
capital (time and eort) that the individual sets aside for this activity. The latter embodies the idea that
individuals may obtain an intrinsic benet from political participation, such as from performing a civic
duty or expressing one's political views.
We denote the utility function by u(c;x). We shall assume that u is increasing in both of its arguments
(uc;ux > 0), but also exhibits diminishing marginal utility (namely, ucc;uxx < 0). Moreover, the level
of consumption that the individual enjoys is determined entirely by her wage income, which is in turn
a function of the amount of human capital that she sets aside for production activity, h. We denote
this wage function by w(h), with the natural assumptions here that this is increasing in h but (weakly)
concave: w0(h) > 0 and w00(h)  0. (The latter assumption admits for the possibility of decreasing
marginal productivity.)
As a nal feature of the setup, individuals face a human capital constraint: h + x = H. Here, H
denotes the individual's level of human capital or equivalently, her total eective units of labor. In this
setting, education serves the role of raising H, thus increasing the total eective units of labor that the
individual can subsequently allocate to both production and political activities.
Bearing in mind that c = w(h), the individual's allocation problem over the use of her human capital
can thus be written as:
max
h;x
u(w(h);x)
s.t. h + x = H:
The corresponding rst-order conditions are:
uc(c;x)w0(h) = ;
ux(c;x) = ;
where  is the associated Lagrange multiplier. Equating the two rst-order conditions yields:
uc(w(h);H   h)w0(h) = ux(w(h);H   h): (7)
Now, let us suppose further that ucx  0, namely that utility from consumption and political partic-
ipation are weakly complementary. Moreover, it is natural to specify an appropriate set of Inada-type
conditions, namely uc(0;x) and ux(c;0)  ! 1, so that the marginal utility from either the rst incre-
mental unit of consumption or political participation is innite. We will also assume that the marginal
utilities uc and ux are nite whenever h and x are strictly positive. It is then straightforward to check that
28the left-hand side of (7) is strictly decreasing in h, while the right-hand side will be strictly increasing in
h. The Inada conditions moreover imply that the left-hand side of (7) tends to innity at h = 0, while the
right-hand side tends to innity at h = H. The intermediate value theorem then guarantees that there
is a unique interior solution for the optimal allocation of human capital to production activities, which
we can denote by h; the corresponding allocation to political activities is given simply by x = H   h.
Role of Education: We rst show that an increase in educational attainment that raises H will
lead the individual in question to allocate more human capital to both production and political activities.
This can be seen by totally dierentiating (7), which yields:
dh
dH
=
ucx
uc   uxx
ux
ucx
uc   uxx
ux +

ucx
ux   ucc
uc

w0   w00
w0
; and
dx
dH
=

ucx
ux   ucc
uc

w0   w00
w0
ucx
uc   uxx
ux +

ucx
ux   ucc
uc

w0   w00
w0
:
In particular, the second equation for dx
dH comes from using the expression for dh
dH , as well as the fact that
dx
dH + dh
dH = 1. One can check that the assumptions regarding the signs of the derivatives of u(c;x) and
w(h) indeed ensure that the numerators of both dx
dH and dh
dH are strictly positive, while their common
denominator is also strictly positive. Since dx
dH + dh
dH = 1, it follows that dx
dH ; dh
dH 2 (0;1), so that the
allocation of human capital to both sets of activities increases, as claimed.
Introducing Productivity Shocks: We now incorporate a role for individual shocks to labor
market productivity. Suppose in particular that the wage function for individual i is given by wi(h) =
i ~ w(h), where i = P
i + U
i . Here, i is an individual-specic productivity level, with P
i denoting
the component of productivity that is predictable given an individual's biographical characteristics (and
which in principle can be controlled for in a regression model), while U
i refers to the unpredictable
component which we can think of as an idiosyncratic productivity shock. It will be helpful to assume
that the expected value of U
i is 0. Note that we have introduced the subscript `i' as a reminder that these
productivity terms are specic to each individual. (To be consistent, we should attach this subscript too
to x, h, and H, but we suppress this to keep the notation cleaner.)
We now illustrate that our model gives rise to a key interaction eect between individual schooling and
labor market productivity on the allocation of human capital. More formally, this involves understanding
what determines the sign of d2x
dHdi. It will be helpful here to adopt a specic functional form for both
u(c;x) and w(h) to shed light on these eects. (In principle, one can also proceed by making assumptions
about the third-derivatives of the utility and wage functions, but such assumptions are in general less
intuitive.) We consider in particular:
u(c;x) = cc + xx; c;x 2 (0;1); and
~ w(h) = h;  2 (0;1):
It is straightforward to check that these expressions satisfy the rst- and second-derivative assumptions
that we have spelt out earlier. Note moreover that we do allow the c, x and  parameters to vary
with individuals, even though we do not explicitly write down the subscript `i' here to save on notation.
For example, decreasing returns to production eort may kick in faster for some individuals than others,
which would correspond to dierences across individuals in their  parameters.
29With the above, the expression for dx
dH now simplies to:
dx
dH
=
1   c
(1   x)h
x + 1   c
:
The sign of d2x
dHdi is thus determined by how h=x responds to i. To pin this down, we substitute the
expressions for u(c;x) and w(h) into (7) to obtain:
(h)1 c =
c
x

c
i (x)1 x:
Total dierentiation then implies that:
dh
di
=
c

1 x
x +
1 c
h
> 0;
where we have also made use of the fact that dx
di =  dh
di , since x + h = H. It thus follows that
h=x increases when i increases, so that d2x
dHdi < 0. In words, a higher i corresponds to a positive
improvement to productivity that raises the marginal return to devoting human capital to production
activities. This correspondingly lowers the incentives to devote a marginal unit of additional human
capital to political participation, x. Note that since i = P
i +U
i , both the predictable and unpredictable
components of productivity have the same comparative static implications. (We assume here that P
i >
jU
i j, so that the i > 0. In words, the predictable component of productivity is large relative to the
productivity shocks, so that the overall productivity term remains positive.)
Mapping to the Empirics: In the rst step of our empirical strategy (Section 2.2), we estimated
an ordered logit regression of the determinants of an individual's income decile. We now show why the
income residual measure that we constructed from this regression would be positively correlated with
the unpredictable productivity shocks in the context of the above framework. In the above model, an
individual's (log) income level is given by: log w(h) = logi +  logh. Although we do not have a
closed-form expression for h, we can nevertheless write it as a general function of the deep parameters
of the model, namely as h(U
i ;P
i ;c;x;;H).
We now take a rst-order Taylor approximation of log w(h) around U
i = 0 (the mean value of the
unpredictable productivity shocks):
logw(h)  log(P
i ) +  logh(0;P
i ;c;x;;H) + U
i 
h
1(0;P
i ;c;x;;H)
h(0;P
i ;c;x;;H)
: (8)
Here, h
1 refers to the partial derivative of h with respect to its rst argument, U
i .
To map this to the data, recall that we only observe the income decile to which each individual
belongs, and not logw(h) itself. Denote the (log) income values that determine the decile cutos in
ascending order by: logw(0);logw(1);:::;logw(9);logw(10), where logw(0) is dened as  1 and logw(10)
is dened as +1. Then, the probability that individual i will belong to income decile k 2 f1;:::;10g is
given by:
Pr

logw(k 1)   log(O
i )    logh

< U
i
h
1
h <

logw(k)   log(O
i )    logh

where we have suppressed the arguments of h and h
1 to keep the expressions compact. The above
would t within the framework of an ordered logit regression under the following two conditions. First,
30U
i is drawn from a logistic distribution centered around 0. (The presence of the
h
1
h term means
though that we should allow for heteroskedasticity in the individual error terms. Short of modeling this
heteroskedasticity more explicitly, we estimate the regression with robust standard errors.) Second, the
terms log(P
i )+ logh can be adequately controlled for by a linear function of respondent biographical
characteristics and country-survey wave xed eects which are the explanatory variables in the ordered
logit regression.
Accordingly, we evaluate the income residual for each individual i as:
yi  
10 X
k=1
k  Pr
h
logw(k 1)   log(P
i )    logh

< Z <

logw(k)   log(P
i )    logh
i
where yi is the reported income decile of the individual, and the second term above is her predicted
income decile. Note that the probabilities are evaluated treating Z as a random variable from a logistic
distribution with mean 0.
The following two thought exercises are now useful for clarifying why the income residual measure
constructed as such is useful for capturing the role of the unpredictable productivity shocks, U
i . First,
consider the case of two individuals who have identical biographical characteristics, but dierent calcu-
lated values for the income residual. These dierences must be driven by diering observed values of yi,
since the expected income decile that we predict would be the same for both individuals. In particular,
the individual with the higher reported yi would have a higher calculated income residual. Note how-
ever that yi is (weakly) increasing in i's actual (log) income level, which in our framework is given by
logw(h). But from (8), we know that dierences in logw(h) between the two individuals must be driven
by dierences in U
i , since both individuals are otherwise identical. It follows that the individual with
the higher calculated income residual must have experienced a higher U
i . (Recall here in particular that
h
1 > 0, so that logw(h) is in fact increasing in U
i from the rst-order approximation.) Conditional on
respondent biographical traits, the income residual measure is thus positively correlated with the labor
productivity shock.
Second, consider a situation where two individuals have the same yi, but dier in their biographical
characteristics. It follows (except in a knife-edge situation) that the two individuals must have experi-
enced dierent U
i 's. In this case, information on the individuals' income decile itself is not useful for
distinguishing which of the two actually experienced the higher productivity shock. The income residual
measure would instead be more useful for this purpose: One can infer that the individual with the larger
income residual would have experienced the larger productivity shock, given that one would otherwise
have expected her to fall in a lower income decile when basing this prediction solely on the basis of
observed biographical traits.
31Data Appendix
A. Individual-level data
World Values Survey (WVS): From the WVS website. The measures of political participation
used are described in the main text (Section 2.1). The education and income decile variables are respec-
tively from questions X025 and X047. The eight categorical responses for the education variable are as
follows: 1 = Inadequately completed elementary education; 2 = Completed elementary education; 3 =
Incomplete secondary education: technical/vocational type; 4 = Complete secondary education: tech-
nical/vocational type; 5 = Incomplete secondary education: university-preparatory type; 6 = Complete
secondary education: university-preparatory type; 7 = Some university without degree or lower-level
tertiary certicate; 8 = University with degree or upper-level tertiary certicate.
The respondent characteristics used include dummies for: gender (X001), age groups (generated from
question X003), and number of children (X011). The marital status dummies are based on question
X007, with dummies for each of the following categories: married; living together as married; divorced;
separated; widowed; single/never married; living apart but steady relation; unreported/missing.
The 84 countries/territories in our sample are listed below. We indicate in parentheses the survey
waves for which data was available for each country. Albania (3-4); Algeria (4); Andorra (5); Argentina (3-
4); Armenia (3); Australia (3,5); Azerbaijan (3); Bangladesh (3-4); Belarus (3); Bosnia and Herzegovina
(3-4); Brazil (2,3,5); Bulgaria (3,5); Burkina Faso (5); Canada (4-5); Chile (3-5); China (3-5); Colombia
(3); Cyprus (5); Czech Republic (3); Dominican Republic (3); Egypt (4-5); El Salvador (3); Estonia (3);
Ethiopia (5); Finland (3,5); France (5); Georgia (3,5); Germany (3,5); Ghana (5); Great Britain (3,5);
Guatemala (5); Hong Kong (5); India (2-5); Indonesia (4-5); Iran (4-5); Iraq (4-5); Italy (5); Japan
(4-5); Jordan (4); Kyrgyzstan (4); Latvia (3); Lithuania (3); Macedonia (3-4); Malaysia (5); Mali (5);
Mexico (3-5); Moldova (3-5); Morocco (4-5); Netherlands (5); New Zealand (3,5); Nigeria (2-4); Norway
(3,5); Pakistan (3-4); Peru (3-5); Philippines (4); Poland (3,5); Puerto Rico (3-4); Romania (3,5); Russia
(3,5); Rwanda (5); Saudi Arabia (4); Serbia and Monetenegro (3-4); Serbia (5); Singapore (4); Slovakia
(3); Slovenia (5); South Africa (2-5); South Korea (2-5); Spain (3-5); Sweden (3-5); Switzerland (2,3,5);
Taiwan (3,5); Tanzania (4); Thailand (5); Trinidad and Tobago (5); Turkey (2-5); Uganda (4); Ukraine
(3,5); United States (3-4); Uruguay (3,5); Venezuela (3-4); Vietnam (4-5); Zambia (5); Zimbabwe (4).
Note that we drop wave 5 of the Netherlands from our regression sample when \strike" is the dependent
variable. This is because there are only two surveyees who responded to this question, both of whom
gave the same response. The country-survey wave dummy therefore perfectly predicts their responses.
B. Country-level variables
Incumbent Turnover: Following Campante et al. (2009), coded from Worldstatesmen.org. While
political systems and titles dier from country to country, we took the chief executive to be the de
facto head of government. In practice, this would most commonly be the president for countries with
a presidential system of government, and the prime minister for countries that adopt a parliamentary
system. There are however some exceptions. First, for most communist states, we coded the secretary-
general of the communist party as the chief executive. Second, there are a handful of countries for which
32executive power clearly lay in the hands of a leader who never assumed the associated formal title, such
as Deng in China, Noriega in Panama, and Qadda in Libya. In such instances, we treated these rulers
as the chief executive given their de facto hold on power. Third, in cases of a military-controlled state,
we coded the military junta as the chief executive. Finally, we counted the emergence of interim and
acting heads of government as leadership changes, even if the original chief executive returned to power
thereafter. This mechanical rule views the need for such interim arrangements as a potential indication
of instability relative to the status quo.
Schooling: From Barro and Lee (2010). Primary, secondary, and tertiary years of schooling for the
population aged 25 and above are used.
GDP per capita: From the Penn World Tables, version 7.0. The real GDP per capita chain series
(constant purchasing power parity prices) is used. For China, the \CH2" observations are used; these
adjust the PPP price levels to account for the over-sampling of urban prices in the raw data.
Population: Total population is from the Penn World Tables, version 7.0. The population shares
for the age 15-24 and age 25-39 cohorts is computed from Barro and Lee (2010), which is in turn based
on the UN population database. These are calculated as shares of the population aged 15 and over.
Democracy: From the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). We use the democracy score,
which is on a scale of 0 to 10. Observations scored as  66,  77, and  88 in the original data (to reect
periods of foreign interruption or domestic transition) are dropped.
3325th Median 75th Mean Std Dev
Measures of political participaton
Demonstration  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 1 1 0.665 0.735
Occupy  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 0 0 0.151 0.409
Boycott  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 0 1 0.489 0.665
Strike  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 0 0 0.280 0.551
First Principal Component, Protest modes -1.240 -0.534 0.853 0.000 1.492
Petition  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 1 2 0.884 0.809
Discuss Politics  (Range: 0 to 2) 0 1 1 0.840 0.670
Vote  (Range: 0 or 1) 0 1 1 0.745 0.436
Individual-level controls
Age 28 38 51 40.69 15.71
Gender  (0=Male; 1=Female) 0 1 1 0.51 0.50
Number of children 0 2 3 1.99 1.82
Education  (1=Lowest; 8=Highest) 2 4 6 4.42 2.33
Income decile  (1=Lowest; 10=Highest)  3 4 6 4.54 2.39
Income Residual ("Pooled") -1.418 -0.160 1.281 -0.016 2.030
Income Residual ("Non-Parametric") -1.332 -0.141 1.223 -0.015 1.967
Income Residual ("Country-Wave") -1.265 -0.112 1.206 0.003 1.923
Confidence in Government (Range: 0 to 3) 1 1 2 1.43 0.94
Satisfaction with Government (Range: 0 to 3) 1 1 2 1.27 0.87
Financial Satisfaction (Range: 0 to 10) 3 5 8 5.48 2.63
Political self-positioning (1=Left; 10=Right) 4 5 7 5.69 2.43
Political extremism (left) 0 0.5 1.5 0.87 1.32
Political extremism (right) 0 0 1.5 1.06 1.52
Religiosity (Range: 0 to 2) 1 2 2 1.69 0.55
Table 1
Summary Statistics: World Values Survey
Notes:  Tabulated for the sample of 191,302 observations used in our regressions of income decile on respondent 
characteristics, which provide the basis for computing the income residual variable. Dependent variable: Demonstrate Occupy Boycott Strike First PC (OLS) Petition Discuss Pol Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.1274*** 0.0436* 0.1120*** 0.0817*** 0.0679*** 0.0953*** 0.1365*** 0.1038***
[0.0163] [0.0263] [0.0171] [0.0207] [0.0169] [0.0182] [0.0168] [0.0205]
IncResid -0.0910** -0.0480 -0.0894 -0.0491 -0.0749 -0.1948*** -0.1305*** -0.0153
[0.0409] [0.0617] [0.0551] [0.0609] [0.0503] [0.0448] [0.0296] [0.0465]
Income Decile 0.0978** 0.0228 0.1100* 0.0529 0.0830 0.2386*** 0.1649*** 0.0303
[0.0472] [0.0695] [0.0639] [0.0671] [0.0569] [0.0447] [0.0281] [0.0478]
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166593 103526 164005 108038 95590 168233 125543 57672
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0897 0.1012 0.1225 0.0936 0.1521 0.1679 0.0720 0.2039
No. of countries 80 61 80 63 60 81 67 45
No. of surveys 138 88 137 93 86 140 99 45
Education 0.1272*** 0.0429 0.1120*** 0.0816*** 0.0678*** 0.0953*** 0.1364*** 0.1038***
[0.0162] [0.0262] [0.0171] [0.0206] [0.0169] [0.0182] [0.0167] [0.0204]
Education * IncResid -0.0053*** -0.0086*** -0.0045*** -0.0042** -0.0051*** -0.0010 -0.0025 0.0011
[0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0031]
IncResid -0.0654 -0.0046 -0.0677 -0.0276 -0.0509 -0.1901*** -0.1186*** -0.0203
[0.0415] [0.0604] [0.0533] [0.0597] [0.0511] [0.0493] [0.0352] [0.0504]
Income Decile 0.0984** 0.0236 0.1104* 0.0534 0.0834 0.2386*** 0.1652*** 0.0304
[0.0473] [0.0698] [0.0640] [0.0672] [0.0569] [0.0446] [0.0279] [0.0478]
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166593 103526 164005 108038 95590 168233 125543 57672
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0898 0.1014 0.1226 0.0936 0.1523 0.1679 0.0720 0.2039
No. of countries 80 61 80 63 60 81 67 45
No. of surveys 138 88 137 93 86 140 99 45
Table 2
Baseline Specification: Education, the Income Residual, and Political Participation
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns are estimated by ordered logit, except 
Column 5 which uses the first principal component of Demonstrate, Occupy, Boycott, and Strike as the dependent variable, and is estimated by OLS. All Columns include: (i) individual-
level dummies for age group, gender, number of children, and marital status; as well as (ii) country-survey wave fixed effects. Dependent variable: Demonstrate Occupy Boycott Strike First PC (OLS) Petition Discuss Pol Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.0134 -0.2054*** 0.0515*** -0.1613*** -0.0529** 0.0545** 0.2235*** 0.0143
[0.0223] [0.0228] [0.0195] [0.0295] [0.0255] [0.0245] [0.0273] [0.0419]
Education * IncResid -0.0140*** -0.0090* -0.0122** -0.0143** -0.0215*** 0.0053 0.0057 -0.0198**
[0.0043] [0.0052] [0.0049] [0.0062] [0.0043] [0.0048] [0.0041] [0.0094]
IncResid -0.0445 0.0227 -0.0629 -0.0001 0.0263 -0.2700*** -0.2012*** 0.0930
[0.0299] [0.0692] [0.0590] [0.0666] [0.0402] [0.0515] [0.0377] [0.0764]
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc Decile & Ed * Inc Decile? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education * Country-wave FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166593 103526 164005 108038 95590 168233 125543 57672
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0940 0.1060 0.1269 0.0985 0.1634 0.1716 0.0768 0.2098
No. of countries 80 61 80 63 60 81 67 45
No. of surveys 138 88 137 93 86 140 99 45
Table 3
Full Specification: Controlling for Education interacted with Country-Survey Wave Fixed Effects
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns are estimated by ordered logit, except Column 
5 which uses the first principal component of Demonstrate, Occupy, Boycott, and Strike as the dependent variable, and is estimated by OLS. All Columns include: (i) individual-level 
dummies for age group, gender, number of children, and marital status; (ii) country-survey wave fixed effects; (iii) income decile and its interaction with individual education; as well as (iv) 
individual education interacted with the full set of country-survey wave fixed effects.Dependent variable: Demonstrate Occupy Boycott Strike First PC (OLS) Petition Discuss Pol Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.0144 -0.2043*** 0.0525*** -0.1595*** -0.0521** 0.0548** 0.2245*** 0.0133
[0.0222] [0.0226] [0.0194] [0.0294] [0.0254] [0.0245] [0.0272] [0.0417]
Education * IncResid -0.0131*** -0.0078 -0.0111** -0.0129** -0.0204*** 0.0060 0.0069* -0.0189**
[0.0043] [0.0051] [0.0049] [0.0061] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0041] [0.0093]
IncResid -0.0547* 0.0271 -0.0891 -0.0014 0.0160 -0.2863*** -0.2404*** 0.0494
[0.0305] [0.0741] [0.0580] [0.0683] [0.0407] [0.0513] [0.0404] [0.0802]
Age 25-34 * IncResid -0.0063 -0.0193 0.0016 -0.0319** -0.0102 0.0058 0.0183* 0.0441**
[0.0080] [0.0160] [0.0088] [0.0136] [0.0094] [0.0080] [0.0110] [0.0196]
Age 35-44 * IncResid -0.0017 -0.0409*** 0.0272** -0.0119 -0.0025 0.0152* 0.0471*** 0.0604***
[0.0083] [0.0156] [0.0106] [0.0134] [0.0088] [0.0090] [0.0120] [0.0224]
Age 45-54 * IncResid 0.0145 -0.0142 0.0354*** -0.0047 0.0129 0.0234*** 0.0607*** 0.0705***
[0.0096] [0.0184] [0.0112] [0.0151] [0.0104] [0.0088] [0.0150] [0.0228]
Age 55-64 * IncResid 0.0320*** 0.0449** 0.0447*** 0.0283* 0.0285*** 0.0253*** 0.0565*** 0.0475**
[0.0109] [0.0185] [0.0114] [0.0149] [0.0083] [0.0091] [0.0145] [0.0229]
Age 65 and over * IncResid 0.0255* 0.0491** 0.0498*** 0.0535*** 0.0291*** 0.0263* 0.0360** 0.0479*
[0.0144] [0.0212] [0.0168] [0.0166] [0.0109] [0.0147] [0.0173] [0.0276]
p-value: Age 25-34 * IncResid  [0.0361] [0.9087] [0.1417] [0.6058] [0.8806] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.2238]
Age dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc Decile & Ed * Inc Decile? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ed * Country-Wave FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 166593 103526 164005 108038 95590 168233 125543 57672
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0941 0.1063 0.1271 0.0987 0.1637 0.1716 0.0770 0.2101
No. of countries 80 61 80 63 60 81 67 45
No. of surveys 138 88 137 93 86 140 99 45
Table 4
Age versus Education
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns are estimated by ordered logit, except Column 5 which 
uses the first principal component of Demonstrate, Occupy, Boycott, and Strike as the dependent variable, and is estimated by OLS. All Columns include: (i) individual-level dummies for age 
group, gender, number of children, and marital status; (ii) country-survey wave fixed effects; (iii) income decile and its interaction with individual education; as well as (iv) individual education 
interacted with the full set of country-survey wave fixed effects. The reported p-value is for a test of whether the overall effect of the income residual for the 25-34 age group is equal to 0. Dependent variable: Demonstrate Occupy Boycott Strike First PC (OLS) Petition Discuss Pol Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.0241 -0.1805*** 0.0613*** -0.1835*** -0.0425** 0.0597** 0.2274*** -0.0075
[0.0186] [0.0273] [0.0186] [0.0280] [0.0185] [0.0269] [0.0241] [0.0430]
Education * IncResid -0.0130*** -0.0057 -0.0128*** -0.0141** -0.0203*** 0.0033 0.0082** -0.0217**
[0.0039] [0.0059] [0.0046] [0.0064] [0.0038] [0.0049] [0.0037] [0.0100]
IncResid -0.0372 -0.0025 -0.0515 0.0007 0.0221 -0.2579*** -0.2217*** 0.0547
[0.0269] [0.0696] [0.0535] [0.0641] [0.0351] [0.0539] [0.0382] [0.0744]
Education * Confidence in govt -0.0047 -0.0127 -0.0002 -0.0138* -0.0065 -0.0036 0.0069 0.0002
[0.0063] [0.0088] [0.0058] [0.0075] [0.0052] [0.0048] [0.0057] [0.0084]
Confidence in govt 0.0134 0.0608 -0.0804* -0.0259 0.0024 -0.0163 0.0070 0.2007***
[0.0402] [0.0450] [0.0439] [0.0469] [0.0266] [0.0320] [0.0420] [0.0415]
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc Decile & Ed * Inc Decile? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ed * Country-Wave FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147779 93108 146071 97397 86542 148727 107326 52622
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0855 0.1073 0.1217 0.0987 0.1588 0.1657 0.0739 0.1926
No. of countries 77 60 77 62 59 78 63 44
No. of surveys 129 83 129 88 82 130 88 44
Table 5
Interpreting the Effects: The Role of Grievance
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns are estimated by ordered logit, except Column 5 which 
uses the first principal component of Demonstrate, Occupy, Boycott, and Strike as the dependent variable, and is estimated by OLS. All Columns include: (i) individual-level dummies for age group, 
gender, number of children, and marital status; (ii) country-survey wave fixed effects; (iii) income decile and its interaction with individual education; as well as (iv) individual education interacted 
with the full set of country-survey wave fixed effects.Dependent variable: Demonstrate Occupy Boycott Strike First PC (OLS) Petition Discuss Pol Vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education -0.0600** -0.3071*** -0.0227 -0.3082*** -0.1105*** 0.0207 0.1519*** 0.0170
[0.0251] [0.0301] [0.0264] [0.0299] [0.0245] [0.0265] [0.0342] [0.0577]
Education * IncResid -0.0199*** -0.0138** -0.0179*** -0.0193*** -0.0264*** 0.0000 0.0019 -0.0194**
[0.0042] [0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0069] [0.0045] [0.0053] [0.0048] [0.0094]
IncResid -0.0075 0.0797 -0.0171 0.0481 0.0603 -0.2526*** -0.2060*** 0.0989
[0.0287] [0.0674] [0.0558] [0.0681] [0.0452] [0.0585] [0.0385] [0.0843]
Education * Political extremism (left) 0.0202*** 0.0333*** 0.0175*** 0.0207*** 0.0250*** 0.0088*** 0.0102** 0.0191***
[0.0044] [0.0061] [0.0041] [0.0048] [0.0045] [0.0028] [0.0043] [0.0047]
Political extremism (left) 0.0390 0.0096 0.0378 0.0474 0.0064 0.0231 0.0428 -0.0549*
[0.0266] [0.0394] [0.0248] [0.0307] [0.0196] [0.0204] [0.0349] [0.0314]
Education * Political extremism (right) -0.0020 0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0027 0.0005 0.0045 0.0014 0.0047
[0.0033] [0.0053] [0.0035] [0.0057] [0.0031] [0.0028] [0.0032] [0.0054]
Political extremism (right) 0.0367*** 0.0362 0.0334** 0.0205 0.0216* -0.0046 0.0917*** 0.0465
[0.0138] [0.0269] [0.0149] [0.0256] [0.0115] [0.0156] [0.0196] [0.0303]
Education * Religiosity 0.0029 -0.0029 0.0035 0.0106 -0.0082 -0.0042 0.0042 -0.0397***
[0.0066] [0.0133] [0.0076] [0.0073] [0.0071] [0.0064] [0.0088] [0.0139]
Religiosity -0.0938** -0.1734** -0.1413** -0.2356*** -0.0907*** -0.0063 -0.0482 0.2949***
[0.0471] [0.0759] [0.0635] [0.0418] [0.0315] [0.0460] [0.0555] [0.0804]
Individual controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-wave fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inc Decile & Ed * Inc Decile? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ed * Country-Wave FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 123426 76373 120433 80746 71378 123396 85476 43104
R
2 / Pseudo R
2 0.0939 0.1045 0.1259 0.0901 0.1674 0.1758 0.0758 0.2153
No. of countries 78 59 77 62 58 78 62 43
No. of surveys 132 85 130 91 84 132 89 43
Table 6
Interpreting the Effects: Political and Religious Extremism
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by country; ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns are estimated by ordered logit, except Column 5 which uses 
the first principal component of Demonstrate, Occupy, Boycott, and Strike as the dependent variable, and is estimated by OLS. All Columns include: (i) individual-level dummies for age group, gender, 
number of children, and marital status; (ii) country-survey wave fixed effects; (iii) income decile and its interaction with individual education; as well as (iv) individual education interacted with the full set 
of country-survey wave fixed effects.25th Median 75th Mean Std Dev
Executive Turnover (0=No, 1=Yes) 0 1 1 0.606 0.489
Number of Executive Changes 0 1 1 1.069 1.281
Democracy (Range: 0 to 10) 0 6 9.4 5.097 4.171
Years of Primary schooling (ages >=25) 2.520 3.963 5.312 3.942 1.795
Years of Secondary schooling (ages >=25) 0.846 1.635 2.793 1.927 1.368
Years of Tertiary schooling (ages >=25) 0.076 0.217 0.418 0.293 0.286
Log GDP per capita 7.379 8.528 9.629 8.451 1.312
Log Population 8.045 9.038 10.043 9.012 1.686
% Population aged 15-24 21.024 31.571 35.191 28.812 7.776
% Population aged 25-39 29.495 32.514 34.059 32.075 4.220
Median Income Residual (71 countries) -0.217 -0.020 0.099 -0.024 0.226
Table 7
Summary Statistics: Country-Level Variables
Notes:  Tabulated for the sample of 787 country-year observations used in the Table 8, Column 1 regression, unless 
otherwise stated. All schooling data points are observed at five-yearly intervals. All other variables are constructed as 
averages over five-year periods. The democracy variable is summarized for the 744 observations used in the Table 9, 
Column 1 regression. The median income residual measure is summarized for the 71-country sample that is used in Section 
4.2 of the main text.Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Arellano-Bond
Arellano-Bover/ 
Blundell-Bond Logit
Lag number of exec. changes -0.064* -0.067* -0.069* -0.079** 0.112* 0.095 -1.208***
[0.037] [0.037] [0.035] [0.035] [0.064] [0.058] [0.274]
Log (GDPpc) 0.303 0.397 0.357 0.626 3.139** 1.704 2.356
[0.240] [0.250] [0.443] [1.355] [1.458] [1.424] [3.570]
Sec. Schooling  0.968 1.535* 1.972* 1.555 2.513 2.679 4.483
[0.642] [0.923] [1.130] [1.338] [1.671] [1.684] [3.456]
Sec. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) -0.119* -0.169** -0.218** -0.165 -0.315** -0.344** -0.662**
[0.064] [0.074] [0.103] [0.129] [0.151] [0.146] [0.326]
Pri. Schooling -0.258 0.026 0.189 -0.831 -2.894
[0.962] [0.995] [1.348] [1.123] [2.199]
Pri. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) 0.018 -0.018 -0.008 0.107 0.343
[0.111] [0.115] [0.140] [0.128] [0.246]
Ter. Schooling -2.932 -4.872 -2.674 -3.684 -6.929
[4.670] [4.486] [7.475] [7.369] [16.785]
Ter. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) 0.270 0.453 0.193 0.272 0.670
[0.468] [0.444] [0.745] [0.734] [1.687]
% Pop 15-24 -0.269 0.032 -0.071 -0.011
[0.184] [0.209] [0.215] [0.521]
% Pop 15-24 * Log (GDPpc) 0.026 -0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.020] [0.023] [0.024] [0.057]
% Pop 25-39 0.338* 0.521*** 0.448** 1.029**
[0.196] [0.191] [0.183] [0.470]
% Pop 25-39 * Log (GDPpc) -0.039* -0.058*** -0.049** -0.106**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.050]
p-value: AR1 test on error terms [0.0000] [0.0000]
p-value: AR2 test on error terms [0.8414] [0.7320]
Country and year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log (Pop) & Sec. Sch * Log (Pop)? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sec. Sch * Year fixed effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 787 787 787 787 643 787 644
Log (Pseudo) Likelihood -915.927 -909.038 -908.547 -902.819 --- --- -338.100
No. of countries 144 144 144 144 141 144 113
Table 8
Determinants of Government Turnover
Number of Executive Changes / Occurrence of Executive Change
Notes:  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported; these are further clustered 
by country in the "Poisson" and "Logit" specifications. The dependent variable is the number of changes in chief executive during a given five-year 
period, except in Column 7 where an indicator variable for the occurence of an executive change during the five-year period is used instead.  All 
specifications include country and year fixed effects, while all other right-hand side variables are lagged explanatory variables. Estimates are from a 
poisson regression in Columns 1-4, an Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel model in Column 5, an Arellano-Bond / Blundell-Bover linear dynamic 
panel model in Column 6, and a logit regression in Column 7. Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Arellano-Bond
Arellano-Bover/ 
Blundell-Bond
Lag democracy 0.736*** 0.724*** 0.721*** 0.731*** 0.730*** 0.766*** 0.872***
[0.046] [0.048] [0.049] [0.047] [0.047] [0.105] [0.101]
Log (GDPpc) 0.142 0.504 0.509 0.464 2.217 3.832** 4.274**
[0.356] [0.396] [0.404] [0.549] [1.735] [1.926] [1.936]
Sec. Schooling  -0.009 1.903** 1.422 2.471* 2.724* 6.787** 6.608**
[0.156] [0.776] [1.361] [1.367] [1.443] [2.742] [2.951]
Sec. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) -0.192** -0.202* -0.331** -0.372** -0.678** -0.632**
[0.075] [0.112] [0.137] [0.149] [0.290] [0.299]
Pri. Schooling 0.118 -0.403 -1.409 -1.421
[1.182] [1.159] [2.745] [2.139]
Pri. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) 0.003 0.070 0.204 0.169
[0.120] [0.118] [0.257] [0.216]
Ter. Schooling -14.654* -12.287 -11.056 -5.201
[8.301] [8.990] [13.219] [12.467]
Ter. Schooling * Log (GDPpc) 1.477* 1.221 1.102 0.538
[0.821] [0.895] [1.289] [1.219]
% Pop 15-24 0.221 0.563** 0.601**
[0.271] [0.244] [0.258]
% Pop 15-24 * Log (GDPpc) -0.019 -0.056** -0.061**
[0.027] [0.026] [0.029]
% Pop 25-39 0.359 0.511** 0.437*
[0.247] [0.241] [0.245]
% Pop 25-39 * Log (GDPpc) -0.034 -0.047* -0.039
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026]
Lag democracy (2 periods) -0.219*** -0.265***
[0.057] [0.057]
p-value: AR1 test on error terms [0.0009] [0.0006]
p-value: AR2 test on error terms [0.9038] [0.7854]
Country and year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log (Pop) & Sec. Sch * Log (Pop)? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sec. Sch * Year fixed effects? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 459 602
R-square 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 --- ---
No. of countries 133 133 133 133 133 124 132
Table 9
Determinants of Democratization
Polity IV Democracy Score (0-10)
Notes:  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported, clustered by country in the 
"OLS" specifications. The dependent variable is the average Polity IV democracy score during a given five-year period. All specifications include 
country and year fixed effects, while all other right-hand side variables are lagged explanatory variables. Estimation is via OLS, except in Column 6 
where an Arellano-Bond estimator is used and in Column 7 where an Arellano-Bover / Blundell-Bond estimator is used.